INTERVIEW, Page 78Keep the Powder DryGeneral JOHN GALVIN, NATO commander, counters Gorbachev'sP.R. offensive with hard facts about the Soviet militaryBy Michael Kramer, John Galvin
Q. Is the West witnessing a true perestroika, or restructuring
of the Soviet system, with a diminished desire for expansion, or
merely a peredyshka, a breathing space, during which Moscow wants
to rebuild its economic might without any real change in its
long-term geopolitical objectives?
A. I agree the words are sweet, but there are a number of
significant anomalies. There is a lot of dissonance between what
they say, which seems to have captured everyone's imagination in
the belief that the cold war is over, and what is actually being
done. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev talks about withdrawing 10,000
tanks, but Soviet tank production is very high. They're now
producing about 3,000 tanks a year -- far better tanks, by the way,
than anything they are talking about removing. Consider what just
this one indicator means. They say, and I agree after having
studied it, that it will take them about two years to pull back the
10,000 tanks in an orderly fashion. By then they will have added
at least 6,000 newer ones. It is certainly strange that their tank
production is so high when they already have such a superiority
relative to the allies. Recall too that this increase in tank
production is occurring when Gorbachev says he's cutting military
expenditures in order to deal with domestic needs. Taken alone,
this evidence could compel you to throw up your hands, say
Gorbachev isn't serious and walk away. But it is possible that
Gorbachev has simply changed so many variables already, like
retiring the old marshals and permitting civilian think tanks to
comment on military strategy, that production is an area he simply
hasn't got around to yet.
On the other hand, maybe he wants to delay dealing with
armaments production till he feels more confident about his control
over the military. The Soviet sale of bombers to Libya is another
action that makes no sense when compared to Gorbachev's rhetoric.
The fact that one has to weigh and wonder about all this means that
we have to keep our powder dry and not rush into big reductions
when the jury is still out.
Meanwhile, the problem of Western euphoria over Gorbachev is
complicated by Moscow's having been particularly clever in its
understanding of the public relations value of unilateral
announcements -- something the West has yet to learn. When the
Soviets make unilateral announcements, Moscow reaps a tremendous
p.r. benefit, and I'm left with the reality -- continued huge
Soviet military capabilities. It's difficult to get the public to
realize that unilateral pronouncements uncodified by treaty are
easy to turn around, as are intentions generally. I'm routinely
criticized for a supposedly overly simplistic insistence on
assessing capabilities rather than intentions. Well, we hope
Gorbachev means what he says, but if he changes his mind and we
have reduced our own military strength on the basis of a rhetoric
of intentions when his capabilities haven't really changed much at
all, then we could be in big trouble fast.
Q. But Gorbachev has now offered to reduce the Warsaw Pact's
conventional forces essentially to parity with NATO's. Isn't that
what we've always wanted?
A. It depends on the fine print and on what becomes of our
nuclear capability in the process. A parity of conventional forces
has never meant peace in Europe.
And even if an agreement on conventional parity does come off,
we need to know the nature of the forces that would be left. The
tank-production anomaly, for instance, indicates that we'd face a
leaner but meaner Warsaw Pact force when all is said and done.
Q. Assume that a parity satisfactory to you is finally
achieved. At that point, would you be willing to denuclearize
Europe, as the Soviets and many Europeans want?
A. No. I don't want to see us ever do away with our nuclear
capability in Europe. My No. 1 mission is to deter war, not simply
win one. For 500 years, every European generation has had to learn
anew about war. Now, for four decades we haven't had one here. I
don't think it's a coincidence that this period has coincided with
the nuclear age.
The logic for nuclear weapons in Europe has always been
twofold. First, they have compensated for the conventional-force
imbalance between the alliance and the Soviet bloc. Second, and
more important, they are a deterrent. They raise the level of
uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor. He has to
consider that the cost of war may be too high. It's the element of
unpredictability of what might happen in a nuclear exchange that
keeps war from happening. So regardless of whether we can ever get
conventional-force parity, I believe nuclear weapons have an
indispensable peacekeeping value irrespective of the conventional
balance.
Q. The West Germans say they believe in the value of a nuclear
deterrent, but they want to negotiate with the Soviets on the
short-range nuclear force (SNF) right away. What's wrong with that?
A. The problem is that the result of a negotiation might be
different. We could be railroaded into something we don't want to
do, which is to wipe out all nuclear weapons in Europe, the
so-called third zero.
While it's true that the Soviets have more short-range nuclear
weapons -- and that they've modernized their short-range missiles
while we are still relying on our old Lance, we nevertheless have
a sufficient capability to create that crucial uncertainty in their
mind regarding a war's outcome. I don't want to risk a run to zero
by opening up a negotiation in the current climate.
Q. Some who are sensitive to the internal German political
situation, like Senator Sam Nunn, are urging that the West indulge
the Germans' desire for immediate SNF talks, but would mandate that
whatever nuclear agreement is reached not be implemented until the
conventional-force agreement is carried out. Isn't that an
acceptable compromise?
A. I admit it sounds fine. But, again, there is so much
uncertainty about everything now that I wouldn't want to risk that
kind of tied-together negotiation's running away from us to a third
zero.
Q. If European opinion demands no ground-based nukes at all on
European soil, NATO would still have substantial air and sea
nuclear capability. Wouldn't they be sufficient?
A. Theater nuclear forces were put in Europe in the first place
because Europeans didn't find it credible that the U.S. would come
to their defense with nuclear strikes if only Europe were in danger
of being overrun in a conventional war. Putting the nuclear
capability to sea would not only be returning toward the
discredited massive-retaliation doctrine, it would also mean that
most if not all of the capability would be in the hands of the U.S.
and Britain, which would probably cause the continental nations to
again wonder if their allies would use these weapons if it became
necessary. Also, the Soviets have a superior air-defense
capability, and the alliance has relatively few airfields. It is
therefore possible that in the Soviet military's mind, the Warsaw
Pact could suppress a nuclear strike from NATO aircraft and thus
lower the cost factor sufficiently so that they might conclude they
could win a war in Europe that would be worth winning. That's why
having nuclear missiles in Europe is essential to the overall mix.
Q. NATO only has 88 Lance short-range nuclear-capable missile
launchers. The U.S. and Britain want to modernize them. Germany and
most of the other NATO nations are against modernization. Since the
Lances are mainly on German soil, why shouldn't their view prevail?
A. The Lance will be dead by 1995 unless is it is modernized.
There is such a thing as electronic rust. That means that by '95
you could fire a Lance without enough assurance that it wouldn't
be a dud. Increasing the range should be appealing to everyone,
including the Germans. That means we could move the missiles back
from the front lines. Increasing the Lance's range would give us
more territory in which to hide them, thus making the deterrent
safer, and it would give us greater flexibility about actually
using them. The farther back, the more likely the missiles will
survive until you need them. But we have to be careful not to push
the Germans. At this point, we have the luxury of being in the
research stage and of not having to push anyone on the deployment
question at a time when their circuits are overloaded. My view is
that we shouldn't force answers to questions before we have to ask
them.
Q. But what happens to the NATO strategies of forward defense
and flexible response if there is no Lance at all?
A. Forward defense is the strategy the alliance wants. It is
a militarily feasible strategy, but, of course, it is not the
classic defensive strategy. The classic defense is one that is
mobile, trading space for time. We don't have the space to pull
back, so we rely on nuclear weapons. But in a Lance-less world, we
might have to relook the strategy. The risks would increase greatly
simply because we would have lessened the nuclear capability
available for deterrence purposes. I for one would not like to
operate at that level of risk, and I don't think the alliance would
find it very satisfactory over the long run.
Q. What if the European environment changes so radically that
there are no longer any nuclear weapons on the Continent at all?
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said it would be almost impossible
to keep 326,000 U.S. forces in a denuclearized Europe. As the
saying goes, "No nukes, no troops." Do you agree with Cheney?
A. First of all, it was the U.S. Secretary of Defense who said
that -- and I might add that his predecessor said the same thing
-- and it seems to me that people have got to take that into
